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Security and Stability Reframed, Selective Engagement Maintained? 
The EU in the Mediterranean after the Arab Uprisings 
 
Word count: 6,371 words 
 
Abstract. This conclusion provides a comparative survey of the main findings of this special 
issue and suggests avenues for further research. It shows that the security-stability nexus 
through which the EU approaches the Southern Mediterranean has experienced some measure 
of reframing in the wake of the Arab uprisings. While leading the EU towards a more inclusive 
approach, this partial frame redefinition has on the whole translated into forms of highly 
selective engagement. This conclusion suggests that this mismatch between the change in 
frame definition and its enactment in different policy areas can be accounted for with reference 
to four factors: institutional sources of policy rigidity, time lag, issue politicisation and the 
willingness of Mediterranean partners to engage with the EU. 
Keywords: EU-Mediterranean relations; reframing; security-stability nexus; selective 
engagement; Arab uprisings 
 
Introduction 
The Arab uprisings that started in 2011 were viewed as a moment of crisis that could 
potentially lead to a significant change in the EU’s approach towards the Mediterranean 
region. Not only were the authoritarian regimes in power challenged by popular protests, but 
the policies implemented by external actors, including the EU, were also deemed to have 
failed. Facing this new situation, the EU response to the uprisings was presented as aiming to 
address the root causes of the revolts and contribute to the democratic development of 
Southern Mediterranean countries. This resulted in the ‘more-for-more’ approach and the 
establishment of some new programmes (e.g. SPRING, ENPARD, etc.) (European 
Commission, 2011a, 2011b). However, most of the literature agrees that the EU approach in 
the aftermath of the Arab uprisings has been marked by continuity with past policies, only 
masked with a new rhetoric of participation, inclusion, and democracy (e.g. Colombo & Tocci, 
2012; Teti, 2012). It is argued that EU policies have only changed cosmetically, but that they 
continue to favour the pursuit of the same EU interests, namely its own security through the 
stability of the Southern Mediterranean. Thus, in strong continuity with its policies of 
cooperation with authoritarian regimes prior to the Arab uprisings, the EU approach has 
remained anchored in a security-driven logic aimed at ensuring stability in the region and EU 
 2 
 
economic profit (e.g., Durac & Cavatorta, 2009; Gillespie & Youngs, 2002; Seeberg, 2009; 
Youngs, 2004). For the literature, hence, there is still a rhetoric-practice gap, according to which 
the EU keeps preaching the importance of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, but 
it is ready to turn its back to these principles when it comes to protecting its security and 
ensuring stability, which remain the real priorities of the EU in the Mediterranean.  
While there is some truth to this argument, as EU policies have hardly undergone a 
complete overhaul, the contributions to this special issue have at least qualified this view. The 
investigation of a number of policy areas and countries undertaken here shows more variation 
than is usually allowed for in the literature. This variation appears to be greater in the 
conceptualisation and understanding of the issues at stake than in actual policy 
implementation. While this might point towards relatively unchanging policy outcomes, the 
extent of rethinking apparent in how the EU engages in specific policy areas suggests that a 
mere instrumentalist understanding positing a rhetoric-practice gap is also limited. 
With the aim of providing a more granular picture of change and continuity, this special 
issue has thus proposed that the security-stability nexus should be considered a master frame 
shaping the EU approach to the Mediterranean. Hence, each contribution has looked at the 
extent to which the interpretation of the security-stability nexus has changed in the wake of 
the uprisings. This decision was based on two elements. On the one hand, as discussed in the 
introduction, the limitations of existing accounts can at least partly be attributed to their 
tendency to take EU interests as given. A focus on frames, understood as ways of interpreting 
information and simplifying reality by identifying a specific problem definition and cause-
effect relations, providing possible actions and offering a moral evaluation (Bardwell, 1991; 
Dery, 2000; Entman, 1993; Huber 1991), appears especially promising, as it allows a 
problematisation of how EU interests are understood in different policy domains. On the other 
hand, as the literature on framing usually focuses more on their definition, this special issue 
has also asked how the security-stability master frame has been enacted by the EU in its 
relations with Southern Mediterranean partners. Enactment has been addressed with 
reference to the modalities of EU engagement with MENA partners as well as the inclusiveness 
of this engagement, that is: the range of actors involved. Additionally, inasmuch as frames are 
the result of interactions among actors trying to make sense of the surrounding environment, 
the consequences of engagement on the EU framing of security and stability have also been 
considered. 
 
Lessons learnt: reframing and selective engagement in EU-MENA relations 
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In light of this discussion, some main findings emerge from the comparison of all policy areas 
analysed in this special issue. First, while security and stability still feature prominently in the 
EU approach to different sectors in the region, it appears that the security-stability nexus has 
experienced some partial change or reframing (Laws & Rein, 2003). If the security-stability 
master frame informs the EU overall approach, it has been shown that, for example, security 
and stability in the economic area are understood differently than in the case of religion and 
relations with Islamist parties. In the economic sphere, security is predominantly defined as 
the security of investments and activities of EU-based companies, which requires political 
stability, often conflated with regime stability. In contrast, security takes on an ontological 
dimension when it comes to religious engagement and relations with Islamist actors. Here, the 
defining frame is based on the secular-liberal identity of the EU and the need to have a stable 
cognitive environment that does not challenge the self.    
Putting into question static views of EU interests, most contributions have shown that 
there has been a partial change or reframing in the security-stability nexus in each policy area 
in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. The clear outlier in this respect is Durac’s contribution 
on counterterrorism, which suggests that regime stability has continued to be at the heart of 
EU policy in this area exactly as it was prior to the uprisings. On this front the EU appears 
chiefly concerned with the potentially destabilising effects of genuine regime change entailed 
by democratisation, which might lead to a greater terrorist threat. At the same time, Durac 
notes, this short-termist approach props up autocratic and repressive regimes, thus 
reproducing a very fertile environment for terrorist recruitment.  
It would not be unfair to say that in the majority of cases in which security and stability 
are actually reframed, the understanding of the nexus has only been altered at the margins, 
with the most evident repercussions in terms of the method or approach to be used to reach 
security and stability in each specific area. Thus, while the Arab uprisings have partially 
challenged underlying assumptions about each specific policy, they have not produced a U-
turn in EU frames. Dandashly for instance suggests that after the uprisings the EU 
understanding of democracy promotion has shifted towards ‘deep democracy’, but also – and 
equally importantly – towards a strengthening of the focus on ‘human security’. At the same 
time, both of these developments are constrained and shaped by the persistence of a material 
understanding of security revolving around the stability of Southern Mediterranean regimes. 
In the case of religious engagement, instead, Wolff suggests that in the wake of the Arab 
uprisings the EU approach has been shaped by a twin concern with both ontological and 
traditional security. Interestingly, the scope of the former has been broadened, leading the EU 
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to focus more on training its diplomatic staff on how to develop a greater sensitivity to 
religious issues. According to Wolff, however, these changes are still essentially geared 
towards putting the EU in a better position to promote its own secular-liberal model, which is 
still considered the best tool for maximising EU security. 
Both Kourtelis and Roccu demonstrate that the Arab uprisings have clearly questioned 
the EU’s assumptions about security and stability. In the case of financial reforms, Roccu shows 
that the Arab uprisings led to a reframing of the idea of stability for the EU, which went beyond 
the stability of the regime to include the concept of ‘deep democracy’ and the job-creation 
functions of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Despite a changed perception in the types 
of needs, however, an ordoliberal template remains the preferred method to push for reforms 
and change in the region. Minor changes have also been observed by Kourtelis in the 
agricultural sector, where food, environmental and political security are still at the heart of the 
EU approach. However, in the wake of the uprisings these elements are now understood in a 
way that has led the EU to pursue an integrated approach to agricultural development that is 
more inclusive, comprehensive and bottom-up, at least on paper. Not dissimilarly, in her 
discussion of reframing Herranz-Surrallés argues that the market-liberal frame that has long 
characterised energy policy has been partially modified, as the preference for energy market 
integration prior to the uprisings is now complemented by a stronger emphasis on the need to 
ensure energy supplies due to geopolitical concerns. 
More visible changes in the master frame can be seen both in EU relations with Islamist 
parties, and in EU migration governance. With respect to the former, Voltolini and Colombo 
show that, while security and stability continue to be perceived in ontological terms, the EU 
does not apply a black-or-white approach to political Islam anymore, which in the past had 
led to the categorisation of all Islamists as a potential threat to the EU’s identity. Instead, it has 
adopted a more nuanced view of security, according to which some forms of political Islam 
are not a threat to the EU’s identity and can thus be engaged with. Migration governance 
arguably provides the case in which the reframing has been most extensive. Here, Geddes and 
Hadj-Abdou detect the emergence of a ‘new normal’, based on accepting the fact that the EU 
faces and will likely keep facing migratory pressures at its Mediterranean borders. This points 
towards migration becoming comparatively more relevant in how the EU defines security and 
stability in its relations with MENA partners. 
Second, the EU has demonstrated its intention to be more inclusive and engage with a 
broader range of actors. This seems to be one of the main changes in the EU approach across 
policy areas, as in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings the EU finds it necessary to reach out to 
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a wide variety of actors, and include them either into the policy-making process or as potential 
beneficiaries of its policies. Economically, the EU has aimed to go beyond the narrow range of 
actors involved before 2011. This was clear in its idea of promotion of Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas as well as in the inclusion of SMEs in several sector 
programmes, such as ENPARD and the Risk Capital Facility discussed respectively by 
Kourtelis and Roccu. Similarly, democracy promotion activities have enhanced the number of 
tools targeting civil society organisations (CSOs), increasingly perceived as key to fostering 
democratic transitions in the region (Dandashly). A broader scope of engagement with 
religious actors, especially Islamist actors, has also become a linchpin of the EU policy after 
the Arab uprisings, with respect to both party politics (Voltolini and Colombo) and relations 
with institutionalised forms of religion (Wolff). Some hints at shifting towards a more inclusive 
policy are also visible in the energy sector, where NGOs and the academia have indicated the 
need for a more developmental and inclusive approach (Herranz-Surrallés). The aim of greater 
inclusiveness is also visible in the migrant-centred perspective envisaged in the ‘Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility’, which additionally opened the way for more sustained 
dialogue at the regional level (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou). Again, the EU intention to keep a 
regime-centric focus appears confirmed only with reference to counterterrorism (Durac).  
Third, this greater emphasis on inclusion is consequential for the more general direction 
of EU policies towards the Southern Mediterranean. Evidence from most chapters however 
appears to dispel the view that engagement with a broader range of actors translates into more 
substantial policy change. In the more economic spheres, in fact, all inclusionary moves have 
gone towards reinforcing, and indeed broadening and deepening, the same economic model. 
Herranz-Surrallés is perhaps slightly more open to the possibility of productively 
accommodating alternative views within the market-liberal model governing energy relations 
than Roccu is on ordoliberal influences. However, the broad thrust towards re-iterating in 
marginally different terms the same template for economic cooperation and development, in 
a process of ‘failing forward’, very much permeates both accounts, as well as Kourtelis’ one on 
agriculture. In migration governance (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou), religious diplomacy (Wolff) and 
democracy promotion (Dandashly), moves towards greater inclusion appear in fact entirely 
compatible with the further securitisation of the issues at stake, something that has always 
been the case for counterterrorism, as evidenced by Durac. Here, the only outlier appears to be 
the greater engagement with parties in power perceived as moderate representatives of 
political Islam (Voltolini and Colombo). Even in this case, however, the main driver appears to 
be the need to find new interlocutors to cooperate with, as part of the broader ‘pragmatist’ 
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turn now officially enshrined in the EU Global Strategy (2016). This finding on policy direction 
does not necessarily lead us towards the dominant plus ça change view. Rather, it points 
towards how the understanding of security has been broadened in almost all sectors under 
consideration. Being one of its defining elements, this inevitably affects also how the security-
stability nexus is understood, and hence how it can be pursued and enacted differently.  
However, and this is the fourth finding of the special issue, the enactment – studied here 
especially in the form of engagement – shows the EU’s intention to be more inclusive has 
largely remained on paper, as in most cases the number and types of actors actually involved 
has not significantly changed in practice. As shown in the contributions, most of the previous 
patterns of engagement have continued to shape EU policies. Both Kourtelis and Roccu show 
that, despite the idea of opening up to a wider range of actors, EU policies follow similar 
exclusionary logics to the ones pursued before the Arab uprisings. This is visible in as diverse 
sectors as agriculture and migration governance, where the pledge for greater inclusion has 
translated into more engagement with EU-based actors, respectively in the form of think tanks 
and EU-based agricultural SMEs in the case examined by Kourtelis, and in the greater weight 
attributed to migrant destination countries detailed by Geddes and Hadj-Abdou. As shown by 
Herranz-Surrallés, energy policy has followed a similar pattern, as the attempts to make it more 
inclusive and sensitive to developmental issues have not really borne their fruit, with energy 
still circumscribed to state actors, industry representatives and financial institutions. 
Interestingly, even in the case of democracy promotion and engagement with Islamist actors, 
where one might expect stronger evidence of inclusion, the picture is mixed. Here, 
engagement is selective across as well as within countries. As Dandashly demonstrates, civil 
society is more engaged in the case of Tunisia and much less so in the case of Egypt. And even 
in the former case, engagement remains EU-driven, with its real outreach in terms of targeted 
population yet to fully materialise. In the case of Islamist actors, Voltolini and Colombo show 
that political Islam is distinguished into three categories and that only moderate actors are 
engaged with. However, these categories are fluid as highlighted by the ease with which the 
EU has moved from engagement to disengagement in the space of a few years in the Egyptian 
case. Along similar lines, Wolff suggests that new practices of religious diplomacy have 
hitherto taken mostly inward-looking forms, such as the provision of specific training for 
EEAS’ and member states’ diplomats, while engagement with Southern Mediterranean 
partners still sees regime-controlled institutionalised religion as the key point of reference. 
Thus, one can see that engagement remains selective across the board, and highly so in certain 
areas, as documented by Durac with reference to counterterrorism.  
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The final finding is that this selectivity is also shaped by the willingness of Southern 
Mediterranean partners to deepen their engagement with the EU. This is evident if one pits 
the Egyptian case against the Tunisian one. As evidenced by Roccu, all Egyptian governments 
in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, with a partial exception for the first period of the Morsi 
presidency, were less interested in cooperating with the EU on the terms it proposed. Not only 
is the EU less attractive, but Egypt has a wider choice in terms of partners. Moreover, having 
further centralised external relations in the post-Mubarak era, the government is in a much 
stronger position to decide with whom the EU can engage. This is also reflected in the case of 
democracy promotion discussed by Dandashly. The fact that the EU engages less with CSOs in 
Egypt is mainly due to the government’s policy and the constraints it imposes on these actors. 
Exerting a strong control over its population and its organisations, the Egyptian government 
is indeed in the position to impose exclusionary patterns when it comes to EU policies. Part of 
this ability is due to the EU’s perceived necessity to keep Egypt on its side in migration control 
and in the fight against terrorism. In contrast to Egypt, successive Tunisian governments have 
been much more interested in engaging with the EU in their transition process. This emerges 
when we analyse EU democracy promotion, where civil society is much more involved in EU 
programmes (Dandashly). The same applies to EU’s political engagement with Islamist actors. 
While Salafists are still kept at arm’s length, due to the perceived threat that they might pose 
to the EU’s identity and values, the relations with Ennahda have progressively improved and 
the EU has cooperated with the party on a stable basis (Voltolini and Colombo).  
The persistence of selective engagement in the light of at least partial reframing of the 
security-stability nexus provides an interesting puzzle of its own. To be sure, selective 
engagement is not necessarily negative in itself. An improved ability on the part of the EU to 
select appropriate interlocutors in partner countries might bode well in two respects. On the 
one hand, it might signal greater clarity with respect to the objectives that the EU aims to 
pursue in the Mediterranean region, as well as to the local actors best suited to help the EU 
achieve them. On the other hand, more reliance on selective and targeted engagement might 
also mean greater awareness of the differentiation between and within countries in the region, 
thus creating the platform for a move away from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of the past 
(Bicchi, 2006). On both these fronts, the proclaimed pragmatist turn embodied by the EUGS 
might signal a move in this direction. At the same time, selective engagement can also be 
problematic, especially in those circumstances in which this is forced upon the EU by partner 
countries, thus preventing it from engaging with as broad a range of actors as it would 
otherwise be the case. In these cases, selective engagement might actually suggest a weakening 
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of the EU ability to achieve its own goals in the region. In light of the variety of forms and 
meanings that selective engagement can take, and in light of its position as common 
denominator in the enactment of the security-stability master frame in the wake of the Arab 
uprisings, it is all the more important to understand what might account for the mismatch 
between frame (re-)definition and its enactment. 
 
Beyond the rhetoric-practice gap: accounting for the mismatch between defining and 
enacting frames 
The findings outlined above thus point towards some degree of change, which varies across 
countries and policy areas, in how the EU understands the security-stability nexus in its 
relations with Southern Mediterranean partners. This has led to a much greater willingness on 
the part of the EU to engage with a broader range of local actors. However, contributions also 
agree that the enactment of these changes has been limited at best. Here, one could easily 
object: if there is little to no change in terms of actual policies, does this not amount to yet 
another iteration of the rhetoric-practice gap? If we take the relation between discourse and 
practice as one between input and output within a black box, we might well come to this 
conclusion. However, such an approach falls in the trap of deriving ‘real’ intentions – then 
pitted against ‘rhetorical’ ones – from observed outcomes, despite the increasing awareness 
that ‘assumptions about motives based on the observed outcome of a process are not 
necessarily accurate’ (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou, this special issue). This is also because a 
backward inference from outcome to intention entirely bypasses unintended consequences. 
Indeed, one of the underlying threads of this special issue is the weight granted to contextual 
factors, which might interact with EU policies and initiatives to produce outcomes far from 
the ones the EU favours. In the attempt of addressing this shortcoming, frames appear as a 
more promising mid-range concept. Through the study of their definition, redefinition and 
enactment through engagement with Southern Mediterranean partners, one can break down 
the black box leading from intention to outcomes, and hence examine potential ‘blockages’ 
limiting – or inhibiting altogether – the enactment of partially revised frames.  
Reframing is inherent to the interactive nature of the framing process. As they define 
frames as ‘a special type of story that focuses attention and provides stability and structure by 
narrating a problem-centred discourse as it evolves over time’ (2003: 174), Laws and Rein are 
inherently suggesting that frames are not static, and that thus reframing can take place to make 
sense of a changing situation in times of uncertainty (cf. Goffman, 1974). Laws and Rein also 
highlight that frames do not remain confined to the realm of ideas, but are rather embodied in 
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practices, i.e., ‘an interdependent body of intuitions, categories, commitments and actions’ 
(2003: 178). As they are institutionalised over time, practices create patterns of behaviour that 
tend to resist reflection also in the face of new and uncertain circumstances. This is a line of 
argument pursued especially successfully by Herranz-Surrallés (2016) in her work on EU 
energy policy towards Southern and Eastern Mediterranean partners, where she detects a 
significant change in the EU’s background ideational abilities (cf. Schmidt, 2008). However, 
this is not matched by a corresponding change in practices, still shaped by the more traditional 
division of labour between the EU’s energy governance approach and the national energy 
diplomacies. 
In light of this emerging literature, four factors can provisionally be advanced here as 
potential contributors to the mismatch between the redefinition of the security-stability nexus 
in the wake of the Arab uprisings and the relative continuity in terms of practices, and thus in 
the enactment of the security-stability master frame. Firstly, the institutional dimension is 
always important in this respect, and particularly so in the EU case, as it might constitute a 
source of resistance to policy change even when the framing of the policy issue has changed. 
Three institutional elements play this role in the cases examined in this special issue. As 
suggested by historical institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 2000), a first source of 
resistance might emergence from the path dependency deriving from the policy legacies of the 
past. This is visible for instance in the resilience of ordoliberal ideas and practices identified 
by Roccu with reference to economic reforms, but also of institutional practices still reflecting 
the market-liberal frame in the energy sector as discussed by Herranz-Surrallés. A second 
source of resistance to change despite reframing might instead derive from the power 
positions gained within policy-making by specific groups, such as EU-based agricultural and 
financial companies (Kourtelis and Roccu respectively). While perhaps unable to contest the 
reframing of security and stability in their own sector, these actors are still in a position to slow 
down policy changes that might affect their perceived interests. The third and final source of 
stickiness in practices, and thus in the mismatch between frame redefinition and its enactment, 
is specific to the EU and has to do with the overlapping jurisdictions and competences between 
national and supranational levels. This is highlighted especially by Durac and Geddes and Hadj-
Abdou with reference respectively to counterterrorism policy and migration governance. 
Secondly, there can be a temporal lag between ideational change and its enactment due 
to the more enduring nature of practices. For example, Laws and Rein (2003) show that in the 
US it took over twenty years to see a change in practices following a reframing of the problem 
of environmental hazards. Similarly, and closer to the cases examined here, Voltolini (2016) 
 10 
 
finds that although a new frame in EU-Israel relations already began to emerge in the late 
1980s, it took around two decades for this to become the dominant understanding in the EU 
and be implemented into concrete policy steps. It might thus well be that it is still relatively 
early to observe a substantial change in frame enactment.  
Thirdly, the politicisation of specific issues might also affect the ‘transmission 
mechanism’ from frame definition to enactment, as different levels of public attention and 
visibility create different pressures on policy-makers to act. Following Grande and Hutter 
(2016: 7), politicisation could be defined as the ‘expansion of the scope of conflict within the 
political system’. As Hay (2007) argues, politicisation and depoliticisation (as its opposite) 
imply the movement of issues between the arena of fate and necessity (the non-political) to the 
one of deliberation and contingency (the political) (cf. Schmitt, 1966). Despite the pressure 
towards acting that might occur as an issue becomes politicised, the way in which this can 
affect the relation between frame definition and frame enactment is not univocal. On the one 
hand, in the face of perceived policy failure, one could expect the increased salience and 
politicisation of events in the Mediterranean to produce greater pressures towards policy 
change. This might explain the documents produced by the EU already in 2011, in which it 
took some ownership over policy choices that the uprisings proved to be misguided (European 
Commission, 2011a, 2011b). In times of lower salience and politicisation, pressures towards 
substantive policy change might wither. This certainly appears the case with reference to ‘deep 
democracy’ as well as ‘inclusive development’, increasingly becoming hollow phrases as the 
attention of the public opinion within the EU shifted towards the refugee and migration crisis 
and the threat posed by Daesh/ISIS. On the other hand, high politicisation might also 
adversely affect policy change. Indeed, one can argue that the more politicised an issue, the 
more contentious the possible solutions, the higher the risk that the reframing does not result 
in substantive policy change. This is perhaps best exemplified in the case of EU migration and 
asylum policy discussed by Geddes and Hadj-Abdou, where the issue has been increasingly 
politicised and has become hostage of domestic electoral politics in many member states, 
which are concurrently facing the rise of right-wing parties seeking to foster and capitalise 
upon a fear of migrants. This potentially adverse effect of politicisation, especially when it 
leads to a fracture between national and supranational level, is particularly problematic for 
the EU, which has historically demonstrated to thrive upon the depoliticisation of issues to be 
then addressed through technocratic solutions (Kurki, 2011; Radaelli, 1999). 
Finally, given the interactive nature of framing processes as well as the fact that 
engagement is, by definition, relational, one cannot account for the mismatch between frame 
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definition and enactment without considering how Mediterranean countries interact with the 
EU and to what extent they are willing to engage with it. As mentioned earlier, not all Southern 
Mediterranean countries were interested in engaging with the EU in the aftermath of the Arab 
uprisings. New international actors, such as the Gulf countries, Russia and China, have been 
perceived as better partners than the EU as their financial and economic support does not 
imply any formal conditionality. Moreover, some countries have become more vocal in their 
requests to the EU, pushing for their own interests when dealing with the EU and making the 
terms of cooperation less one-sided than before. This is for instance what is detected by Durac 
in counterterrorism policy when he speaks of ‘externalisation in reverse’. Given the turbulent 
times the region is in and the repercussions that are felt in the EU, especially in terms of 
migration and terrorism, it does not come as a total surprise that the EU’s ability to implement 
its policies is shaped and, in some cases, hijacked by the partner countries and their perceived 
interests.   
 
Where to from here? Pointers for a future research agenda 
As it comparatively assesses the sources and degree of policy change and continuity in EU 
relations with Southern Mediterranean partners following the Arab uprisings, this special 
issue contributes directly to the debate suggesting that security and stability are still at the 
heart of the EU approach in the region. We contend that while this might well be the case, one 
also needs to look at whether security and stability, and the relation between them – that is: 
the security-stability nexus – are still defined in the same way they were before the uprisings. 
The empirical analysis carried out along a number of countries, policies and sectors by the 
individual contributions demonstrate, with a significant exception, that the security-stability 
nexus has at least been reframed in the wake of the uprisings. This has also had reverberations 
on how the objectives of security and stability are pursued by the EU, and hence on the range 
of actors that the EU aims to engage with in Southern Mediterranean partner countries. 
Importantly, the special issue also shows that more change has occurred in the redefinition of 
the security-stability master frame than in its actual enactment via engagement. However, the 
empirical material presented suggests that it would be misleading to speak simply of 
continuity, and even more so to derive continuity in intentions from a continuity in outcomes 
The special issue also points towards research avenues that might be pursued fruitfully 
in the future. Two of them are of a more directly empirical nature, although no doubt they 
would also provide interesting theoretical refinements to the aspects assessed in this special 
issue. On the one hand, with direct reference to these conclusions, the hypothesis of the 
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temporal lag between reframing the security-stability nexus and consistently enacting it is one 
that can only be adequately appraised in the future. In this regard, the full roll-out of the EU 
Global Strategy might provide an interesting test of the extent to which the reframing of the 
security-stability nexus is enacted in the Southern Mediterranean. On the other hand, while 
this special issue has focused its attention on the relation between frame definition and 
redefinition and frame enactment in the form of engagement, as well as to the feedback effects 
that such engagement generates on the framing of security and stability, there are two further 
links that need to be probed further in future research. One of them would go back upstream, 
so to say, to look at how different modalities of engagement, as well as different actors 
involved in the process, affect the formulation of specific policies on the part of the EU. The 
other link would instead go downstream, and examine how engagement affects policy 
implementation on both the EU and the partner country level.  
Through its focus on frames as a mid-range concept that allows researchers to eschew 
the binary distinction between norms and interests, at least two interesting lines of more 
theoretical inquiry could emerge from the approach proposed in this special issue. The first 
could shift the focus beyond the security-stability nexus as the master frame orienting EU 
policies in the Southern Mediterranean and ask whether one can see any contending frame 
that is gaining relevance in how the EU approaches the Mediterranean region. Some of these 
frames might eventually be subsumed by the dominant master frame, as it has occurred so far 
for instance in the case of the ordoliberal approach to economic reforms outlined by Roccu, the 
market-liberal frame analysed by Herranz-Surrallés, the secular-liberal frame discussed by 
Wolff with reference to religious diplomacy, and by Dandashly in regard to democracy 
promotion. However, it cannot be excluded in principle that some contending frames might 
eventually contest the hegemonic role hitherto held by the security-stability nexus, however 
articulated. This in turn could have profound theoretical implications for debates on policy 
change in EU relations with the Southern Mediterranean, and more generally with 
neighbouring countries, as well as for debates on how ideas and power dynamics shape EU 
external relations. 
The second line of theoretical inquiry could explore in more detail the cases in which the 
feedback effect produced by engagement with Southern Mediterranean partners translates 
into a fundamental perversion of the original frame. The case of counterterrorism addressed 
by Durac, and what he calls ‘externalisation in reverse’ drawing from Eder (2011), 
demonstrates the extent to which partner regimes can exploit informational asymmetries 
deriving from their knowledge of the domestic and/or regional context and use engagement 
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to achieve different forms of strategic manipulation of the EU. If more cases of this kind would 
emerge, then questions about the EU role in the Mediterranean, but more generally in 
international politics, might be raised. For instance, do these forms of manipulation point 
towards more general weaknesses of the EU as a multi-layered foreign policy actor (Niemann 
& Bretherton, 2013; Smith, 2004)? If EU frames fail to resonate among partner countries, and 
are indeed turned back against the EU itself, does this suggest that the soft, civilian and 
normative means on which the EU has historically relied need to be revised, lest an inexorable 
decline in its regional and global influence? Given the dramatic transformations experienced 
by the Arab Mediterranean, it is about time we start asking these more foundational questions. 
This special issue is but a first, small, step in this direction. 
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